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Abstract  
A human-in-the-loop exploration of a ground-
based automated separation assurance concept was 
conducted that involved the allocation of certain 
functions between humans and automation. This 
exploration included operations that were sustained 
for prolonged periods of time with high levels of 
traffic in the presence of convective weather and 
scheduling constraints. In this environment, the 
automation was allocated the functions of detecting 
separation conflicts, resolving strategic and tactical 
conflicts, providing trajectory trial planning 
assistance, and alerting the controller to urgent 
problems. The controller was responsible for 
supervising the automation, resolving conflicts 
deferred by the automation, resolving convective 
weather conflicts, monitoring and maintaining 
schedule compliance, and placing free track aircraft 
back onto their trajectory. An investigation into the 
acceptability of these roles and performance of tasks 
was conducted where it was found that the 
participants rated the concept and allocation of 
functions with a high level of acceptability. However, 
issues were encountered with the automation related 
to the detection of and response to tactical conflicts. 
Lower ratings were given on account of these 
concerns, and it was found that a key contributor to 
the underlying problems was transitioning aircraft 
and the uncertainty of their trajectories. Stemming 
from those results, participants responded that they 
would rather have direct control over aircraft 
transitions as well as more control over the tactical 
conflict resolution automation. In contrast, 
participants responded that they would rather have 
the automation place aircraft back on trajectory, and 
perform weather avoidance and scheduling tasks. 
 
Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) is expected to provide greater levels of 
capacity and efficiency while maintaining or 
improving upon current levels of safety in the 
National Airspace System (NAS). To do so in the 
face of a predicted increase in airspace demand 
requires a departure from the current paradigm of 
clearance-based air traffic control (ATC) to one that 
incorporates greater levels of automation and 
decision support. This paradigm shift, however, 
raises the important issue regarding the proper 
balance that must be struck between the controller 
and automation, particularly as it relates to the critical 
area of separation assurance. A human-in-the-loop 
(HITL) simulation was conducted that examined an 
approach to function allocation in a far-term air 
traffic control environment, and provided an 
opportunity to investigate controllers’ perceived 
acceptability of their roles and preferred distribution 
of functions. This paper focuses on the results of that 
investigation and expands upon the areas identified as 
unacceptable. 
Function Allocation 
Any operational domain that involves a highly 
complex mixture of information gathering and 
integration, the need for timely and precise decision-
making, and an extremely high level of safety 
criticality may benefit from, or even require, the 
introduction of automation. A subsequent allocation 
of certain functions to the automation previously 
limited to human operators can then occur, but not 
without substantial forethought. A great deal of 
research has gone into the area of function allocation 
between humans and automation that has spanned a 
number of domains [1-4]. Air traffic control is 
certainly no exception [5-8].  
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The nature of the ATC task coupled with the 
historical and projected increases in air traffic 
demand in the NAS has resulted in a variety of 
research and concept development efforts that 
incorporate varying levels of automation and allocate 
functions according to particular focus areas. Two 
primary focal points that define this area of research 
are the air- and ground-based approaches to 
separation assurance and air traffic management as a 
whole. Broadly speaking, in the air-based approach 
[9], certain tasks and functions (e.g., spacing, 
metering, providing safe separation) currently 
performed by controllers are re-allocated to the flight 
decks of aircraft.  
In the ground-based approach, tasks and 
functions continue to reside with the control room 
and related infrastructure. However, function 
allocation is not directed between controller and 
pilot, but rather between controller and automation. 
The Advanced Airspace Concept (AAC) [10] 
developed by Dr. Heinz Erzberger is one approach 
that proposes the application of automation to such 
duties as conflict detection and resolution in both 
strategic and tactical timeframes, weather avoidance, 
and metering.  
Despite its promises and underlying intent, the 
efficacy and benefits of automation are not 
necessarily guaranteed.  Within the context of ATC 
operations, the integration of automation is often 
thought of as a means of reducing controller 
workload and summarily providing a path toward 
accommodating higher levels of air traffic. However, 
with saturated airspace and automation performing 
functions that today aid in the construction of 
situation awareness and maintain controller 
engagement in the sector’s status, it is not clear 
whether such a path is feasible or acceptable. 
Previous studies have shown positive support for 
this path [11-13], but few, if any, have examined an 
environment in which operations involving high 
levels of automation have been carried out in any 
sustained manner. Performing such an examination 
allows for a more relevant perspective and the 
identification of vital issues for a concept and its 
components than can be gained through brief 
exposures in isolation. 
HITL Simulation 
To partly address this issue, a HITL simulation 
was conducted in the Airspace Operations Laboratory 
at the NASA Ames Research Center [14] that 
explored control room operations in a far-term 
environment. This exploration consisted of four, 
three-hour simulation runs that tested the limits of 
airspace capacity and complexity. Such an 
environment required high levels of automation and 
humans interacting with it at various levels. This 
architecture allowed for an investigation into the 
function allocation issues that arise when tested in 
such an environment for prolonged periods of time as 
well as the acceptability of such operations. 
Method 
Participants 
Six current Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) front line managers from different en route 
centers who were current on radar served as test 
participants. Each rotated through radar and area 
supervisor positions in order to operate and evaluate 
the concept from the two perspectives. Four recently 
retired controllers staffed the remaining test 
positions. Four additional retired controllers acted as 
confederate “Ghost” controllers that managed the air 
traffic outside of the test area. Ten general aviation 
pilots participated as pseudopilots and managed the 
flight decks of the simulated aircraft. 
Experimental Design 
This study was a 2x2 within-subjects design 
with Metering and Weather serving as the 
independent variables (Figure 1). The levels of 
Metering were Light and Heavy, which related to 
relative numbers of aircraft scheduled to area airports 
that also required adjustments and active 
management to meet scheduled times of arrivals. The 
distinction between Light and Heavy also translated 
to overall traffic load in that participants experienced 
higher levels of traffic in the Heavy Metering 
conditions than in the Light Metering conditions. As 
a comparison, the Light-Metering scenarios consisted 
of 2,216 simulation aircraft whereas the Heavy-
Metering scenarios contained 3,060 aircraft. 
The levels of the Weather variable were 
Growing and Decaying. This related to the change in 
convective weather patterns over time as they 
transited the test airspace. In the Growing Weather 
conditions, convective weather began developing at 
approximately the midpoint of the simulation run and 
grew large enough to impact a significant portion of 
the test airspace. In the Decaying Weather conditions, 
the run started with weather already impacting the 
test airspace. As the run progressed, the weather 
dissipated as it exited the test airspace. 
 
Figure 1. Experiment matrix for the Metering and 
Weather variables 
Airspace 
A total of eight, en route test sectors were 
staffed. As shown in Figure 2, four of the sectors 
were from the eastern portion of Kansas City Center 
(ZKC) and the other four were from the western 
portion of Indianapolis Center (ZID). This area was 
selected based on prior work and for its range of 
complexity with some sectors consisting of 
predominantly level overflights, and others having a 
mixture of overflights and transitioning aircraft. The 
altitude strata of the test area were set at flight level 
(FL) 290 and above. 
Operational Environment 
The environment simulated in this study was 
designed to incorporate a number of elements 
envisioned to be part of NextGen. In terms of aircraft 
and flight characteristics, full air-ground data 
communication (Data Comm) and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) 
equipage was assumed for all aircraft occupying the 
airspace. Trajectory Based Operations were also 
assumed to be in effect in which all flights were on 
their user-preferred, 4-D trajectories and pre-cleared 
for their departure and arrival transitions. 
 
Figure 2. Test airspace centered on the adjacent 
areas of ZKC and ZID centers 
The environment experienced in the control 
room included sustained levels of high traffic density 
(with peaks sometimes in excess of 60 aircraft within 
a sector) in the presence of convective weather and 
scheduling constraints to area airports. Such an 
environment required a significant departure from the 
standard mode of operations conducted today. As 
shown in Table 1, many of the tasks and functions 
currently assigned to controllers were instead 
assigned to ground-based automation. 
 The automation in this environment was 
responsible for handoffs and transfers of 
communication, detection of aircraft and weather 
conflicts, and the resolution of strategic aircraft 
conflicts (greater than three minutes to loss of 
separation) within defined parameters. Tactical 
aircraft conflicts (less than three minutes to loss of 
separation) were also handled by the automation 
through transmission of vectors to one or both 
involved aircraft via air-ground Data Comm. While 
controllers were responsible for weather avoidance, 
schedule conformance, and ensuring aircraft rejoin 
their trajectories following tactical vectors, their 
overall role in the separation task shifted from active 
control to management by exception [15]. 
 Just as the environment required a change in the 
task distribution and roles of the automation and 
controller, it also required a change in the way that 
information was displayed (Figure 3). In current en 
route operations, all aircraft within a sector of 
ownership are displayed with full data blocks. This is 
an important requirement as the information 
contained in the data block and the act of engaging 
with it helps controllers build and maintain situation 
awareness of the sector.  However, with traffic levels 
ranging from twice to three times current levels as 
they did in this simulation, data blocks would quickly 
saturate the display, forcing the controller to spend an 
inordinate amount of time trying to separate them. As 
a result, by default all aircraft were displayed with a 
limited data block that denoted current altitude and 
transitioning status when applicable.  
With limited data blocks on all aircraft, and the 
automation handling routine and most separation 
tasks, the controller was free to focus on weather 
avoidance and scheduling constraints. The only need 
to divert from those tasks was when the automation 
alerted to conflict situations outside its operating 
bounds or to follow up on a tactical conflict 
resolution. 
Setup and Apparatus 
 A total of eight R-side sector positions were 
staffed. The positions were divided into two separate 
control rooms according to center such that the four 
ZKC positions were in one room, and the remaining 
four ZID positions in another (see Figure 4 for the 
actual layout of sector positions in one room). Each 
room was also staffed by an area supervisor that had 
two workstations available for use. One station was  
 
used primarily for traffic assessment and display, 
which controlled a wall projection of a Traffic 
Situation Display and traffic load graphs for each test 
sector. The other station was used for schedule 
monitoring and management when necessary. 
 
Figure 3. Advanced display with convective 
weather, interactive timeline and conflict list, with 
over 50 aircraft in the sector 
Three confederate “ghost” stations were staffed 
that controlled aircraft outside of the test airspace. 
ZKC Ghost High controlled aircraft to the west, ZID 
Ghost High controlled aircraft to the east, and Ghost 
Low controlled aircraft below FL 290. A total of 10 
pseudopilot stations were also staffed. Each station 
was assigned the aircraft owned by each associated 
test and “ghost” sector. 
Table 1 Allocation of functions between the automation and controller 
Automation Controller 
Detect Separation Conflicts Supervise the automation 
Resolve trajectory-based conflicts (if within 
tolerances) 
Resolve trajectory conflicts flagged by the 
automation 
Resolve all time-critical traffic conflicts Resolve convective weather conflicts  
Alert controller to urgent problems Monitor and maintain schedule compliance 
Provide trajectory planning assistance Place aircraft back on trajectory following 
automated tactical maneuvers 
The common thread that linked all of the 
stations described was the Multi Aircraft Control 
System (MACS) software [16]. MACS allows for a 
wide range of simulation and rapid prototyping 
capabilities. The scalability of the software provides 
the ability to produce not only high-fidelity 
emulations of current displays and interfaces, but 
extends to the development of conceptual displays, 
systems, and environments such as those used in this 
study. All of the stations used in this simulation were 
networked, and data was communicated between 
them via the Aeronautical Data Link Radar 
Simulator. MACS’ data collection function was used 
to record and output a range of data for later analysis. 
Separate screen recordings of each station were also 
captured to support the analysis. 
 
Figure 4. Layout of the four R-side positions in the 
ZID control room during the study 
Procedure 
After receiving informed consent from all 
participants, three days of training were conducted in 
which they were initially briefed on the concept then 
stepped through the tools and procedures. This 
portion involved verbal instruction combined with 
hands-on interaction with the tools in the laboratory.  
Following the training period, formal data 
collection runs were conducted over the course of 
four afternoons. The runs were three hours in length 
and tested the four conditions outlined in the 
Experimental Design subsection. The first condition 
tested was Light-Metering/Growing Weather 
followed by Heavy-Metering/Decaying Weather, 
Light-Metering/Decaying Weather, and finally 
Heavy-Metering/Growing Weather. 
Controller participants were first assigned to one 
of four, three-person teams. Throughout the course of 
each run, these teams rotated through two adjacent 
sectors such that each sector in the pairing was 
worked by each team member for one hour. The 
participants rotated through the positions according 
to a published schedule. Shift changes consisted of a 
relief briefing by the outgoing controller, followed by 
a sign-in entry by the oncoming controller. The 
relieved controller was then on break for 30 minutes. 
The first portion of this break was allotted for a short 
online questionnaire taken in the break room, and the 
rest of the time was free. 
 During the runs, the participant controllers 
operated according to the function allocation outlined 
in Table 1. Ground-based automation detected 
strategic aircraft conflicts and displayed related 
information to the controller in an interactive conflict 
list (shown in the upper right hand corner of Figure 
3). With less than 10 minutes and greater than three 
minutes to predicted loss of separation (LOS), the 
automation attempted to find a resolution according 
to the algorithm developed as part of AAC. If the 
resulting resolution involved a heading change that 
was 60 degrees or less, an altitude change that was 
less than 2200 feet, and a speed change that was 50 
knots or less, the resolution clearance was uplinked 
directly to the appropriate aircraft. The clearance was 
then automatically loaded and executed through the 
aircraft’s flight management system (FMS). While 
the controller was not involved in this process, they 
were notified of the status through the conflict list: a 
status box on the associated conflict pair’s row turned 
cyan to denote that the resolution was being 
developed, and, if successful within the stated 
parameters, the status color changed from cyan to 
green as the uplink occurred. An additional form of 
feedback regarding the uplink was available through 
the datalink status list.  
If the resulting resolution exceeded the stated 
parameters, the status box turned yellow, which 
signified that the automation had deferred the 
resolution of the conflict to the controller. A number 
of options were available for the resolution of such 
conflict situations. An automated resolution could be 
requested through the conflict list or directly through 
the aircraft data blocks, modified if necessary, and 
uplinked manually. A specifically tailored resolution 
could also be developed by the controller through the 
manual trial planning of trajectories. The trial plans 
were probed for conflicts in real time and feedback 
was provided on the display regarding the predicted 
conflict status. When deemed a suitable resolution, 
the trial plan could be manually uplinked to the 
aircraft. In addition to the options just described, the 
controllers always had the ability to issue verbal 
clearances as they do today. 
In the case of urgent conflicts (less than five 
minutes to LOS) aircraft symbols were highlighted in 
yellow on the display. If a conflict progressed to, or 
was detected with less than three minutes to LOS, 
tactical vectors were developed by a separate 
algorithm module for one or both aircraft in the 
conflict pair. On the display, the involved aircraft 
were highlighted in red and their data blocks were 
pushed up to be full. Included in the data block was 
additional information regarding which aircraft 
would receive a tactical vector, and what the 
direction of turn and new heading would be. Once 
stable, these vectors were sent directly to the aircraft 
in an attempt to avoid a LOS. Once executed from 
the flight deck, the aircraft began their turns and the 
display indicated that they were in free track status. It 
was then the controller’s task to rejoin the aircraft to 
their original trajectories. 
In addition to separation functions, controllers 
were expected to manage timelines and scheduling 
constraints to area airports as well as initiate weather 
avoidance maneuvers. In terms of scheduling, the 
airports with meter fix constraints were BNA, CVG, 
MSP, ORD, SDF, and STL. Controllers were tasked 
with ensuring arrivals to these airports met their 
Scheduled Time of Arrival (STA).  To aid in this 
task, sector positions were augmented with 
interactive timelines (shown to the right of Figure 3) 
that presented each aircraft’s Estimated Time of 
Arrival (ETA) relative to its STA. If the two were out 
of sync, the controller could request an auto-
generated clearance solution to align the ETA with 
the STA through the timeline. Additionally, aircraft 
that were early or late relative to their STA had an 
indication of the time difference included in the data 
block information. A solution could also be requested 
through this portal, or a trial plan trajectory could be 
initiated and manipulated. The impact of the 
proposed trajectory on the time difference was 
updated in real time. Once a satisfactory solution was 
reached, it was manually uplinked to the aircraft. 
For weather avoidance, aircraft predicted to 
penetrate convective weather had data block 
information that included a blue number, which 
denoted the predicted time to penetration. In this 
case, controllers initiated a trial plan trajectory and 
manipulated it in such a way as to avoid the weather. 
As the trial plan was manipulated, it was also conflict 
probed and the time to weather impact updated in real 
time. Once a clear trajectory was found, the trial plan 
was manually uplinked to the aircraft. 
At the conclusion of each run, participants 
completed an online questionnaire. Following the 
final data collection run, a comprehensive post-
simulation questionnaire was presented to each 
participant that covered a range of topics related to 
the concept and operations as they were presented in 
the simulation. This was followed by a debrief 
discussion in which the participants were invited to 
interact with the researchers to discuss their 
experience and impressions of the overall simulation 
and to expand upon topics touched upon in the 
questionnaires. 
Results 
The primary results from this simulation were 
previously reported in [17]. Conclusions reported 
there were that the concept of ground-based 
automated separation assurance, as tested, was able to 
provide consistent benefits in terms of throughput. 
The automation performed well, overall, particularly 
considering the density and complexity of the 
environment. Participants reported general 
acceptability of the concept, and also provided 
valuable insight into some of the issues related to 
their role within the concept and the allocation and 
performance of functions as they were defined and 
tested. 
 The following results and ensuing discussion 
explore these insights through a combination of 
subjective data provided by the post-run and post-
simulation questionnaires, and objective system data 
used as a vehicle for supporting and quantifying the 
subjective data.  
Role Acceptability  
A number of questions were asked of the 
participants regarding the functioning and use of the 
automation, as well as the distribution of roles in the 
simulation. Perhaps the most direct question posed 
was simply, “How acceptable was your role in this 
automated separation concept?” On an interval scale 
from one to five, with five representing highest 
acceptability, the mean response rating was 4.33 
(SD= 0.69) suggesting a high level of acceptability 
for the distribution of roles as they were presented 
and its operational feasibility. 
Automation Support and Performance 
 In terms of the level of support provided by the 
automation, participants rated that it provided 
“reasonable” support (M= 3.89, SD= 0.58). As the 
level of traffic increased throughout a run, 
participants also felt that they started to rely more on 
the automation (M= 4.67, SD= 0.49) and that, 
overall, they needed to place trust in the automation 
“often” (M= 4.33, SD= 0.59). An important part of 
this necessary trust and reliance was related to the 
automation’s performance of separation assurance 
tasks. In terms of conflict detection, participants were 
asked, “How easy would it have been to determine 
whether a conflict between aircraft was imminent if 
you had not had the automation to assist you?” 
Participants responded that it would have been 
“almost impossible” without the automation (M= 
1.44, SD= 0.70). When asked whether the automation 
solved an acceptable number of strategic conflicts, 
participants responded that it resolved a “reasonable” 
number (M= 3.50, SD= 1.20). A number of conflicts 
could not be solved strategically however. In such 
cases, a tactical conflict was presented to the 
automation for resolution. Acceptability ratings on 
the resulting tactical resolutions were less than ideal 
(M= 2.89, SD= 1.08).  
To gain a better understanding of these 
subjective responses, analyses were performed on 
related system data. While there were four separate 
conditions, for the purposes of this analysis the data 
was aggregated across conditions. This was in 
keeping with the presentation of subjective data at the 
concept level and allowed for the establishment of a 
relationship between the two data components. In an 
effort to show the differences in operational and 
system characteristics across the test airspace and to 
help explain some of the rather large standard 
deviations observed in subjective responses, much of 
the objective data that follows is separated and 
presented according to test sector. 
The following subsections are divided into two 
main categories: Separation Assurance, and Function 
Allocation and Performance. Presenting Separation 
Assurance first serves as a prelude and provides some 
background to the latter category of results. 
Separation Assurance  
Strategic and Tactical Conflict Detections 
Following from the questionnaire response 
regarding the “reasonable” number of strategic 
conflict resolutions, the number of strategic and 
tactical conflicts detected was examined. After all, 
for a conflict to be resolved strategically, it must first 
be detected as such. In this analysis, for a conflict to 
be counted it must have met the following criteria: 
predicted LOS within one of the test sectors, greater 
than 12-second duration, and more than two 
consecutive conflict probe reports with less than a 
90-second gap between reports. According to this 
classification scheme, conflicts between the same 
aircraft pair that were separated by more than 90 
seconds and lasted for more than 12 seconds each 
were counted as two separate conflicts. In addition to 
these criteria, for a conflict to be classified as 
strategic, its initial predicted time to LOS needed to 
be three minutes or greater. In turn, less than three 
minutes to LOS was classified as tactical. 
In this simulation, a total of 2,819 conflict 
detection events were recorded over the course of 96 
sector hours (12 simulations hours multiplied by 
eight- the number of test sectors). Of this total, 2,458 
(87%) were classified as strategic detections, and 361 
(13%) as tactical. Figure 5 presents the distribution of 
conflict detections across the test sectors where it can 
be seen that the overall number and relative 
contributions of detection types varied quite a bit 
between sectors. At the extremes, sector ZKC 29 had 
relative contributions of strategic and tactical conflict 
detections at 92% and 8% respectively, whereas ZKC 
98 had 81% of conflicts detected strategically and 
19% tactically. Differences such as these were likely 
the drivers behind the large standard deviation 
observed in the responses to the strategic conflict 
resolution item from the questionnaire. 
 Figure 5. Total number of strategic and tactical 
conflict detections per sector 
  Conflict Characteristics 
Further analyses were conducted on the conflict 
detection data to gain a better understanding of the 
characteristics and potential contributors. Of specific 
interest was the role that transitioning aircraft may 
have played in the detection of strategic and tactical 
conflicts. This was an area of interest because 
transitioning aircraft have a greater amount of 
uncertainty associated with their trajectories relative 
to aircraft at level flight. It is therefore likely that 
automation (e.g., conflict probe and resolution 
automation dependent on its information) 
performance is impacted by such uncertainty. 
To examine this impact and the relative 
contributions of transitioning aircraft to strategic and 
tactical conflict detections, the two categories were 
further divided according to conflicts involving level 
and transitioning aircraft. The classification scheme 
used for the two categories was Level-Level in which 
both aircraft were predicted to be at level flight at 
time of LOS, and Transitioning in which at least one 
aircraft was predicted to be climbing or descending at 
time of LOS.  
With respect to strategic conflict detections, of 
the 2,458 total, 1849 (75%) were classified as Level-
Level and the remaining 609 (25%) involved 
transitioning aircraft. Figure 6 presents these results 
separated out by sector where it can be seen that 
some sectors (e.g., ZKC 98) had greater numbers of 
conflicts involving transitioning aircraft than others. 
This is due to the fact that some sectors had arrivals 
and departures to nearby airports as part of their 
traffic mix. 
In contrast to the overall 75% Level-Level and 
25% Transitioning composition observed for strategic 
conflict detections, the makeup of the tactical conflict 
detections was a near reversal. Of the 361 tactical 
detections, 134 (37%) were classified as Level-Level 
and 227 (63%) were Transitioning. This reversal is 
most evident when comparing the two panels of 
Figure 6.  
From these results, it is clear that there are 
inherent difficulties in detecting conflicts 
strategically that involve transitioning aircraft. This is 
particularly important in the type of environment 
tested in this simulation in which aircraft were 
cleared for their arrival and departure transitions 
without controller involvement or awareness. 
 
 
Figure 6. Relative contributions of level and 
transitioning aircraft to strategic and tactical 
conflict detections 
Tactical Conflict Resolutions 
When a conflict was either detected with or 
progressed to less than three minutes to LOS, a 
tactical vector was generated and uplinked via Data 
Comm to one or both aircraft in the pair. Throughout 
the study, a total of 508 tactical vectors were issued. 
Figure 7 presents a breakdown of the relative 
numbers between the test sectors with further 
categorization according to the magnitude of heading 
changes involved. This was included simply to get a 
sense of the types of clearances that were generated 
by the tactical resolution algorithm. Of the total 
number, 51% of the vectors were between 30 and 60 
degrees, 30% were less than 30 degrees, 15% were 
between 60 and 90 degrees, and 4% involved turns of 
90 degrees or greater. It is worth pointing out that the 
issuance of these tactical vectors is heavily dependent 
on the information supplied by the conflict probe. 
Based on that, the closer an aircraft pair was to time 
of LOS (or the later a conflict was detected), the 
more extreme the required heading change was to 
avoid the LOS. 
 
Figure 7. Total number of tactical vectors issued 
per sector with a breakdown of heading changes  
From the post-run questionnaire, the 
acceptability ratings for the tactical resolutions were 
rated at (M= 2.89, SD= 1.08), which translated to 
“sometimes acceptable.” Comments provided by 
participants later in the questionnaire shed some light 
on why the ratings were fairly low. One participant 
mentioned that they “got frustrated with the 
[automation] turning aircraft right when the aircraft is 
in a left turn to get back on course and avoid traffic.” 
Another noted that, “when an aircraft was stopped in 
its descent due to traffic, [the automation] would still 
turn the level crossing traffic. This would compound 
the problem because the two would not cross but go 
off on a heading that would need to be corrected. 
They would also alert with more aircraft.” Echoing 
this statement, another participant remarked that, 
“some of the [tactical vectors] turned the aircraft into 
each other with LOS. Then, as they were in free 
track, they alerted with other aircraft and it just 
continued.”  
These comments and others like them allude to 
the idea that the tactical resolutions themselves were 
not necessarily the issue, but that the timing, 
complexity of environment at time of clearance, and 
lack of control over the situation and automation by 
the controller were. These factors have implications 
for controller/automation responsibility and 
requirements that will be discussed later in the paper. 
Losses of Separation 
Despite the strategic and tactical auto resolvers 
working in conjunction with the controllers’ efforts, a 
number of losses of separation still occurred. Over 
the course of the simulation, a total of 42 LOS events 
were recorded. Of those, 34 were classified as 
Operational Errors (closest point of approach (CPA) 
less than 4.5 nautical miles (NM) laterally and 800 
feet (ft) vertically), and the remaining eight as 
Proximity Events (CPA between 4.5 and 5.0 NM 
laterally and less than 800 ft vertically).  
A more detailed description of the LOS events 
can be found in [17]. Data presented here are the 
result of examining these events in terms of issues 
related to conflict detection, conflict characteristics, 
and tactical resolutions.  
The first concern addressed was the type of 
conflicts that preceded the eventual LOS with the 
intent of being able to categorize the LOSs according 
to those that began as a strategically or tactically 
detected conflict. This involved a comparison of the 
LOS events with the conflict detection data presented 
earlier in the Strategic and Tactical Conflict 
Detections subsection. Each aircraft pair involved in 
a LOS was searched for in the conflict detection data 
set for a match. Results from this effort were that no 
matches were found that progressed directly from a 
strategically detected conflict to a LOS; all events 
classified as a LOS were either initially detected with 
less than three minutes remaining or not detected at 
all (at least according to the criteria set out for 
categorization as a detected conflict). 
Similar to the conflict detections reported 
earlier, further analysis was performed on each LOS 
event to understand the relative contributions that 
level and transitioning aircraft might have made. As 
shown in Figure 8, the majority of LOS events (69%) 
involved at least one aircraft in transition. This is not 
necessarily surprising given that it is close to the 
proportion of transitioning aircraft in tactically 
detected conflicts (63%). However, it does reinforce 
the importance of trajectory uncertainty and the need 
to account for it in some way. 
The final analysis performed on LOS data 
investigated how many of the events had an 
association with the automated tactical conflict 
resolver. This was done because the purpose of that 
safety layer is to avoid a LOS, so it was a way of 
examining its performance. What was found through 
this analysis was that of the 42 LOS events, 22 (52%) 
involved a tactical vector in some way. This meant 
that in half of the cases, the issuance of an automated 
tactical vector either caused or failed to avoid an 
imminent LOS. This is not, however, an indictment 
of the underlying algorithm or its functioning because 
there are a number of variables that affected its 
performance (e.g., late conflict detections, controller 
interactions, etc.). This result simply points to 
additional areas that need to be considered as the 
concept matures. 
 
Figure 8. Contribution of level and transitioning 
aircraft to LOS events 
Responsibility 
With the automation allocated the strategic and 
tactical separation assurance functions and the 
controller managing by exception, the question of 
responsibility arises. One questionnaire item asked 
the participants, “Should you become the responsible 
party when you intervene in a conflict?” Of the 18 
response opportunities, 16 were “Yes” responses and 
the remaining two were non-responses. However, 
later comments provided by the participants revealed 
that this was not such a clear-cut issue.  
Some comments were in firm support of the 
responses. For example, regarding controller 
responsibility, one comment read, “Absolutely.  This 
is why you are there: to monitor the automation and 
to solve conflicts that it can't.” Other comments such 
as, “Yes, the controller should be responsible for 
their actions,” and, “The controller should shoulder 
the ultimate responsibility for the sector,” provided 
further support.  
However, comments such as, “I believe if you 
have enough time to fix the problem, the controller is 
responsible,” begin to show that there are perhaps 
conditions on the responsibility. Following from this 
comment are others that are more explicit. Examples 
are, “If the computer can't come up with a resolution 
and asks you to but there isn't an out then I don't see 
how you can place blame/responsibility on the 
controller,” and, “If you issue a control instruction, 
you are responsible. If the computer issues a control 
instruction, it is responsible. So, if you are 
responsible to solve the confliction when the 
computer cannot, then you are responsible. However, 
if the computer only gives you a minute or two to 
resolve the situation, that is a VERY grey area.” 
These valuable comments point out that the 
issue of responsibility is an important one that will 
likely need to be considered very carefully. Vital to 
this area is the performance of the automation in its 
assigned tasks. While the automation did perform 
well, in general, a number of areas for improvement 
were discovered. These will be discussed following 
the completion of the results. 
Function Allocation and Performance 
Task Distribution 
Table 1 outlines the function allocation as it was 
defined and tested in this simulation. To understand 
how that translated to actual performance of those 
functions and associated tasks, the number of 
clearances sent via Data Comm were counted and 
categorized according to their source. Few, if any, 
voice clearances were transmitted and therefore not 
pursued. 
 Over the course of the simulation, a total of 
7,296 clearances were uplinked to aircraft. The initial 
approach to categorizing these clearances was to 
separate them according to those initiated by the 
tactical vector automation, conflict resolution 
automation, and the controller. Figure 9 presents the 
overall distribution of these clearances according to 
test sector. Of the total, 508 tactical vectors were 
issued by the automation, which accounted for 7% of 
clearances. The automated conflict resolver was 
responsible for 1,729 clearances, which accounted for 
24% of the total number. By far the largest source of 
uplinks was the controllers. A total of 5,059 
clearances were uplinked by the controllers, which 
accounts for 69% of the total number and translated 
to approximately one uplink per minute. 
 
Figure 9. Total number of clearances issued by 
controllers, conflict resolution automation, and 
tactical vector automation 
Controller Clearances 
The observation that the controllers were 
responsible for 69% of uplinks in the simulation 
initially came as a surprise given the levels of 
automation in place. To examine this result more 
closely, the clearances issued by the controllers were 
further broken down in order to account for the tasks 
that that they were in support of.  
The task categories were defined according to 
those assigned to controllers and presented in Table 
1. In addition to the conflicts, weather, scheduling, 
and trajectory management categories, an additional 
multi-purpose category was added for clearances that 
met the assignment criteria for more than one 
category (e.g., a clearance sent to an aircraft with 
both a trajectory conflict and predicted weather 
penetration). Assignment to each of these categories 
was mutually exclusive such that each individual 
clearance only existed in a single category. 
 Assignment was based on basic indicators from 
the output. Assignment to the conflict category 
required that the aircraft had an associated conflict 
aircraft at the time of uplink. For weather assignment, 
the aircraft required an associated weather 
penetration prediction at time of uplink. For 
assignment to the scheduling and trajectory 
management categories, defining the relevant criteria 
to use was more difficult. For scheduling, a 
combination of data was used to base assignment 
(e.g., interaction with timeline for an aircraft just 
prior to uplink, associated speed assignments, 
improved ETA and STA alignment, etc.). The 
trajectory management category was basically for 
uplinks that did not meet any of the criteria for the 
other categories. Upon review of screen recordings, it 
appears as though many of these were for placing off 
track aircraft back onto their routes and for route 
“fixing.”  
A great deal of time was spent trying to find the 
most relevant and completely accurate set of criteria 
for assignment to the scheduling category. Based on 
the difficulty encountered with that process, a caveat 
must be included here that there are likely a few 
clearances that appear in the scheduling category that 
belong in the trajectory management category and 
vice versa. This should not affect the overall trend 
however. 
Figure 10 presents a breakdown of the 
clearances based on the categorizations just described 
on a per sector basis. Overall, out of the 5,059 
clearances uplinked by the controllers, 393 (8%) 
were for conflict avoidance, 1102 (22%) were for 
weather avoidance, 2031 (40%) were for scheduling, 
1101 (22%) were for trajectory management, and the 
remaining 432 (9%) were categorized as multi-
purpose.  
 
Figure 10. Controller-issued clearances per sector 
based on task 
Based on these results, it is apparent that 
scheduling made up the bulk of the controllers’ 
taskload followed by weather avoidance and 
trajectory management. In this context then, the fact 
that 69% of uplinks in the simulation were from the 
controllers is not surprising given that the majority of 
their uplinks were in support of routine tasks that 
they were assigned. 
Desired Allocation 
Based on the observations and results regarding 
the clearances issued both by the automation and 
controllers, an additional item of interest was how the 
controllers felt about the taskload that they 
experienced and what they would change regarding 
the allocation of functions. This was addressed 
through questionnaire items that first asked the 
participants to rate their taskload from the run, 
followed by questions regarding whether there were 
tasks that they would have rather performed 
themselves or tasks they would rather have had the 
automation perform.  
A total of 46 responses were obtained regarding 
taskload. If a participant responded that their taskload 
was “low” in the previous run, they were then asked 
whether there were tasks that they would have liked 
to perform themselves. Of the 46 ratings, 33 (72%) 
were low taskload responses. Of those 33, 16 (49%) 
did not respond that there were tasks they would have 
rather performed, which suggests that they were 
satisfied with the allocation of functions. Figure 11 
presents the remaining 51% of responses (in blue). 
Clearly, the task that participants wanted the most 
control over was aircraft climbs and descents. This 
relates very closely to the previous findings on the 
difficulties that resulted from aircraft transitions. The 
next highest response for function reallocation was 
for the solving of short-term conflicts. This is, in 
some way, related to the previous response in that 
many of the tactical conflicts were the result of 
transitioning aircraft. By being able to control 
transitions, they would likely reduce the number of 
tactical conflicts. Additionally, some participants 
commented that they would have liked the ability to 
selectively turn the tactical conflict automation off in 
order to maintain firm control of the situation. 
Of the 46 total ratings, 13 were high taskload 
responses for the previous run. These respondents 
were then asked which tasks they would have liked 
the automation to perform. The most popular 
response for this item was for the automation to put 
free track (out of conformance) aircraft back onto 
their routes. Recall that after every tactical vector, the 
participant was responsible for this (in addition to 
other times when an aircraft managed to deviate from 
its trajectory). When an aircraft was free track, it 
entered a state in which the conflict probe was 
limited to five minutes directly ahead. As touched 
upon in some of the previous comments, there were a 
number of times that an aircraft entering free track 
compounded an already difficult situation. 
 
Figure 11. Questionnaire responses for items 
related to the reallocation of functions 
The next most popular tasks that the participants 
would rather have had the automation perform were 
the trial planning and uplinking of weather and 
metering reroutes. This is not entirely surprising 
given that these were routine tasks that made up the 
majority of controllers’ overall taskload. 
For items in Figure 11 that have no response 
rating, the interpretation is that all participants asked 
either of the function allocation questions opted to 
keep the allocation consistent with what they 
experienced. This meant that participants were 
satisfied with the automation performing transfers of 
communication, and that there should be no 
automation involvement with the participants’ 
display’s range settings. 
Discussion 
Through this simulation, an investigation was 
conducted into the function allocation between 
controllers and automation in a far-term environment 
for prolonged periods of time. This environment was 
constructed based on the concept of ground-based 
automated separation assurance, and included high 
levels of traffic in the presence of convective weather 
and scheduling constraints. The focus of this paper 
was to characterize the defined allocation of 
functions according to the system environment in 
which they were performed in addition to the 
performance and acceptability of assigned roles. 
In this simulation, ground-based automation was 
responsible for the detection and resolution of 
strategic and tactical conflicts, detection of 
convective weather conflicts, trajectory planning 
assistance, and alerting of urgent problems. In 
contrast, the controller was responsible for 
monitoring the automation, resolving conflicts that 
the automation was unable to resolve, performing 
weather avoidance maneuvers, monitoring and 
maintaining schedule conformance, and placing free 
track aircraft back on track.  
Overall, participants reported a fairly high level 
of acceptability for the function allocation as it was 
presented and tested. These positive ratings 
corroborate the operational feasibility of this 
paradigm, which was further supported by the 
findings in [17].  
A significant departure from today’s 
environment was that the automation was performing 
most of the separation assurance tasks. Given the 
complex environment in which the controllers were 
asked to operate, they reported that it would have 
been “almost impossible” to detect imminent 
conflicts between aircraft, and that they came to rely 
on the automation, placing trust in it “often.”  
In terms of conflicts, a total of 2,819 were 
detected by the automation: 87% were detected 
strategically (three minutes or greater to LOS) and 
13% tactically (less than three minutes to LOS). 
When asked if the automation resolved an acceptable 
number of strategic conflicts, participants responded 
that a “reasonable” number were resolved. This 
suggests that there was room for improvement, 
particularly when 19% of the conflict detections in 
one sector were tactical.  
To understand what contributed to the number of 
and responses to tactical detections, an examination 
of conflict cases was conducted.  The focus of this 
examination was on how transitioning aircraft may 
have impacted the performance of the conflict 
detection automation. From this examination, it was 
found that, overall, 63% of conflicts classified as a 
tactical detection involved transitioning aircraft. 
Results for one sector in particular (ZKC 98) showed 
that 79% of its tactical conflict detections involved 
transitioning aircraft.  
For those conflicts that had less than three 
minutes to LOS, an automated tactical vector was 
issued via Data Comm to one or both involved 
aircraft. When asked to rate the acceptability of the 
resulting resolutions, participants rated them as 
“sometimes acceptable.” Subsequent comments 
revealed that they were sometimes “frustrated” with 
this automation over the timing of its resolutions, 
their lack of control over its functioning, and the 
additional problems that free track aircraft would 
occasionally cause following a tactical vector. Taking 
these issues into account, one participant perhaps 
summed it up best when they said simply, “The 
[tactical conflict] automation is good, it just needs to 
be tweaked a bit to be more practical to work with.” 
Despite a tactical safety layer being in place, 42 
LOS events still occurred. An examination of these 
42 cases revealed that they all involved late 
detections, 69% of the cases involved transitioning 
aircraft, and in half of the cases, the tactical conflict 
automation either contributed to or failed to prevent 
the LOS.  
Aside from their contributions to LOS events, 
late conflict detections and the problems stemming 
from them provoked a range of responses to the 
question of responsibility. While all of those that 
responded felt that the controller should be 
responsible after intervening in a conflict situation, 
some provided qualifications to those responses 
through their follow-on comments. These comments 
tended to question the correctness of assigning 
responsibility to the controller if the automation 
could not resolve a situation, leaving little to no time 
for them to react. This is certainly an important issue, 
and one that is outside the scope of this paper. 
Taken together, these results show that the 
uncertainty inherent in transitioning aircraft is a 
critical issue for the safety of an automated system. 
This provides firm support for the findings in [18], 
where it was reported that late conflict detections 
resulting from aircraft in transition (climbing in 
particular) were the “largest contributor” to LOS 
events. Addressing this concern would serve to 
reduce the number of tactical conflicts and likely 
improve the performance of the tactical conflict 
automation by providing it with more accurate 
information with which to operate. This would 
improve safety and possibly provide a means of 
being able to more concretely define the roles and 
responsibilities that the automation and controller 
should have.   
Regarding the role of the controller as it was 
defined in this study, aside from monitoring the 
automation, they were allocated the tasks of resolving 
conflicts deferred by the automation, avoiding 
convective weather, monitoring and maintaining 
scheduling conformance, and placing free track 
aircraft back onto their routes. Through the 
performance of these tasks, the controllers were 
responsible for 69% of the 7,296 clearances uplinked 
over the course of 96 sector hours.  
While the number of controller issued clearances 
may seem like a sizeable proportion, when asked 
about their perceived taskload, the majority (72%) of 
participants responded that they felt it was low. 
Thirty-five percent of the time, participants did not 
offer alternatives to the allocation of functions that 
were set forth, suggesting that they were satisfied 
with its structure. For those that did respond with 
changes to the allocation, the function that 
participants most wanted control over was that of 
aircraft climbs and descents. This is closely aligned 
with the results discussed previously regarding 
tactical conflicts and losses of separation. 
Transitioning aircraft played a significant role in the 
creation of each. It follows, then, that the controllers 
wanted to remove this concern by being able to 
maintain control of when and where aircraft could 
transition. The next function that respondents wanted 
to control, rather than the automation, was the 
resolution of tactical conflicts. From some of the 
earlier comments on their experience with the tactical 
conflict automation, an emergent theme from the 
participants was that they would have liked the 
ability to suspend its actions preemptively or have it 
turned off upon manual intervention. These 
capabilities are, in actuality, part of the Advanced 
Airspace Concept. However, they were not 
implemented in this study as an intentional 
experimental design decision. 
Over the course of the study, it was found that 
the total number of controller issued clearances was 
made up largely of scheduling related uplinks 
followed by weather avoidance and trajectory 
management. For those participants that rated their 
taskload as high, they were asked which tasks they 
would rather have the automation perform. Not 
surprisingly, the tasks selected most frequently for 
automation’s responsibility were those three. Placing 
free track aircraft back onto their trajectories was the 
most commonly selected task for automation to 
perform. This echoes some of the earlier comments 
from participants in that free track aircraft could 
cause a cascade of subsequent problems and 
complexity that were difficult to recover from. This 
was due to the limited conflict probing and 
uncertainty associated with their trajectories in the 
presence of high-density traffic and convective 
weather. Having the automation take care of this task 
would likely prevent these types of cascading 
situations from occurring. 
Next Steps 
Since the completion of this study, efforts have 
been underway to address some of the issues 
previously highlighted. Work has been performed on 
refining the conflict resolution algorithms from both 
the strategic and tactical domains, and performance 
testing is currently being performed. A function has 
also been implemented within the MACS software 
for free track aircraft to automatically regain their 
tracks without the need for controller involvement. 
Additional work has also gone into the convective 
weather probing and resolution capabilities in an 
effort to improve upon earlier versions. 
Conclusion 
The concept of ground-based automated 
separation assurance and the allocation of functions 
as tested in this simulation had a high level of 
acceptability among the participants. However, if the 
automation is expected to perform the safety critical 
task of separation assurance impeccably, then 
improvements are necessary in the areas of trajectory 
prediction and tactical responses. Work is currently 
underway to address these and other issues relevant 
to the progression of the overall concept. Although 
there are important issues that will need to be worked 
out along the way, based on the results presented here 
and the work being performed in response, the 
concept holds promise for a safe and effective air 
transportation system of the future. 
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